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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JUSTIN PAUL CRAFT, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150750-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). See Addendum A 
(Sentence, Judgment, Commitment): R. 280-81. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission 
of two unreliable and suggestive eyewitness identifications of defendant when the victim 
was pistol whipped during the incident and had only a limited view of his assailant. 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question oflaw, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness." 
State v. Fowers, 2011 UT App 383, ,r15, 265 P.3d 832 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Furthermore, whether an eyewitness identification violates the right to due 
process is a question of law that this Court will review for correctness. State v. Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45, ,r 22, 48 P.3d 953. "[H]owever, because this question of law requires the 
application of the record facts to the due process standard, [this Court will] incorporate a 
clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Id. 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved, but it need not be. See State v. Larsen, 
2011 UT App 426, iJ3, 267 P.3d 969 (per curiam). Ineffective assistance of counsel is an 
exception to the preservation rule. Id. 
Issue II: Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
introduction of a hearsay statement by the co-defendants that implicated defendant in the 
crime, in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine 
his accusers. 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question of law, which [the Court] review[s] for correctness." 
Fowers, 2011 UT App at iJ15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved, but it need not be. See Larsen, 2011 UT 
App at iJ3. Ineffective assistance of counsel is an exception to the preservation rule. Id. 
Issue III: Whether, even if the instances of deficient performance identified in 
Points I and II are not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal on their own, taken 
together, they are cumulatively prejudicial. 
Standard of Review: A claim of cumulative prejudice "requires [the Court] to 
apply the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim of error." Radman v. 
Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, iJ4, 172 P.3d 668. 
Preservation: Inapplicable. 
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Issue IV: Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary when the only evidence of these crimes was 
two unreliable eyewitness identifications of defendant, an improperly admitted 
co-defendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail telephone call. 
Standard of Review: "When a defendant challenges a jury verdict for insufficiency 
of the evidence, '[this Court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Noor, 2012 
UT App 187, ,I4, 283 P.3d 543 (mem.). This Court "will reverse the jury's verdict 'only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted."' Id. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel's directed verdict motion 
made at the close of the State's case. R.558. But to the extent this Court believes it is not, 
it should review the issue for plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, if3, 
282 P.3d 1066 (per curiam). "When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under the 
plain error doctrine, 'a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency 
was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the 
jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ifl 7, 10 P.3d 346). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following is attached hereto in Addendum B: Utah Code §76-6-203, Utah 
Code §76-6-302, and U.S. Constitution Amend. VI. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Amended Information charged Justin Paul Craft ("Mr. Craft") with one count 
of aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code §76-6-302 and one count of aggravated 
burglary in violation of Utah Code §76-6-203 as a result of an incident that occurred on 
March 12, 2013. R.252-53. On October 24, 2013, a district court judge granted Mr. 
Craft's motion to sever his case so that he would be tried separately from the co-
defendants. R.46-47,70-71. At the close of a two-day jury trial held on June 16-17, 2015, 
Mr. Craft was convicted of both charges. R.242-243, 250-251, 257-58. On August 24, 
2015, Mr. Craft was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of not less than ten years 
to life for each count, with both counts to run concurrently to each other. R.278-81. Mr. 
Craft timely appealed. R.282. Our supreme court transferred the case to this Court. 
R.286-291. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. Facts Relevant to the Incident in the Home. 
On March 12, 2013, sometime after 11 :50 p.m., three men entered a bungalow 
located on Westminster Avenue in Sugar House. R.394,398,416,424. Alexander Ray 
Davis (Davis) and his mother, Kristin Ane Kirby (Kirby) were in the house. R.392. Davis 
was asleep in his bedroom, located in the basement of the bungalow, and Kirby was 
asleep in an upstairs bedroom. R.397,424. The house was pitch black. R.411,437. 
Davis awoke to "two men punching [him] in the face ... with guns pointing at [his] 
head." R.395. The men pulled Davis from his bed and onto the floor. R.395,398. Davis 
was then pistol whipped. R.395,398,409. Because Davis was not fully awake when the 
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hitting started, he wasn't sure how many times he had been hit. R.398. Davis, however, 
was awake during the time he was pistol whipped. R.409. The beating and the pistol 
whipping made Davis's "whole face[] bloody." R.439. 
The two men repeatedly asked Davis to tell them where they might find "the safe." 
R.397-98. During this time, one of the men stood over Davis and pointed a gun at him 
while the second man searched and "trashed" his room. R.398. In total, Davis was held in 
his room "for about five to ten minutes" at gun point while his room was being searched. 
R.398-99. Both men were wearing black "long sleeves and pants" and gloves. R.397-98. 
They were also wearing ski masks. R.397-98, 411. While in Davis's bedroom, the two 
men kept on their ski masks so that the "only part of [their] faces" that Davis could see 
was "around [their] eyes". R.397-398. Based upon what Davis could see, he noticed that 
one of the men had "darker skin, and [the other] one ... white." R.398,401. (Regarding the 
presence of light in the bedroom, Davis testified at trial that "the lights were definitely 
turned on[,]" but he did not see the men tum on the lights. R.411.). 
The two men then took Davis to a living room area after searching his bedroom. 
R.400. Davis was put in a "sacrificial position[,]" where he was ordered to stay on his 
knees with his head down and his "hands over his head." R.400-01,412. At this point, a 
man stood in front of Davis and held a gun to his head. R.401,413-14. The man holding 
the gun was the same man who had pointed the gun at Davis while in the bedroom. 
R.401. He was also the same man who had pistol whipped Davis. R.410,412. This man 
was "darker skinned." R.401,410,412. The second man -- the one with "lighter skin[]"--
searched the living area, including the closets and the bathrooms. R.400-01. The two men 
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continued to ask Davis questions about the whereabouts of a safe. R.401. Davis was in 
the living area for "about five to ten minutes." R.404. While in the living room, Davis 
saw one of the men- "the white one" -remove his mask. R.401,412. Davis "could still 
look around" and saw the "white-skinned person" in his "peripheral vision". R.412-13, 
415. The white-skinned person was never directly in front of Davis, and at times was 
directly behind him. R.415. 
During the time that these events were occurring, Kirby awoke to a flashlight 
shining in her eyes. R.424-25. Kirby saw a man pointing a gun at her who was wearing a 
mask and a jacket with "light reflecting sides." R.425. She was able to see only "the 
shape of his head" and that he had "[b]lack, short hair, and a big, round face." R.425-26. 
The man ordered Kirby not to look at him. R.425. Kirby "rolled up into a fetus position 
and put [her] hands over [her] eyes." R.425. The man asked Kirby about jewelry and a 
safe, then searched the nightstand and took Kirby's iPad and cell phone. R.425-27. He 
was in Kirby's bedroom for less than ten minutes. R.427. 
After searching her bedroom, the man walked Kirby downstairs to the living area. 
R.428. To get there, Kirby had to walk through the kitchen, where the lights were turned 
off. R.43 7. As Kirby and the man entered the living area, Kirby saw that the closet was 
open, the closet light was on, "and there was movement in the closet." R 428,437-38. 
According to Kirby, the closet light provided "enough light that the whole room was very 
well visible to the eye." R.438. 
At this point, Davis, who was still on his knees, saw a "shorter, heavier set" and 
"dark-skinned male," wearing "all black, with a black ski mask," bring his mother down 
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the stairs into the living area. R.404-05. Davis noticed that the man was pointing a gun at 
his mother's head. R.404. Kirby saw Davis "laying on the ground" and a man was 
pointing a gun at him. R.428. The man walking with Kirby forced her into the "sacrificial 
position" next to Davis. R.404. Kirby and Davis were both "face down on the carpet." 
R.429. Two men held Kirby and Davis at gunpoint while the third man searched the 
closet. R.429. The man who had brought Kirby into the living area told her "don't look 
up at us, don't look up." R.429. Kirby never saw the third man, but "[j]ust heard him in 
the closet." R.438-39. During this time, Kirby and Davis were looking at each other. R. 
415. Davis told Kirby that he was sorry. R. 416. He did so because he felt bad that his 
mother had been put in this situation and he believed that the situation had "something to 
do with the drugs." R.416. 
After about five minutes had passed, Kirby heard one of the men say, "we've been 
here too long." R.429-30. Kirby and Davis "laid there" while one of the men "mov[ed] 
stuff all over the closet." R.430. The men then "shut off all the lights," turned on their 
flashlights, and pointed them at Davis and Kirby "blinding [them] with their lights." 
R.405,412, 417. The three men started walking up the stairs. R.405. One man told Davis 
and Kirby that the men knew where to find them. R.431. The men had their I.D.s -- "all 
of [their] information," - so "if [they] ever tr[ied] to say anything, [the men] w[ould] 
come find [them]." R.405,431. The men took with them items from the house, including 
cellphones, Davis's wallet, an iPad, and a MacBook Air computer, a lap top, golf clubs, 
and two sets of car keys (one of which was for Kirby's Mini Cooper). R.402,407,432-
433. 
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After the men left, Kirby and Davis stayed on the floor for approximately one 
minute. R.431. Once they got up, Kirby noticed that Davis was "bloody from head to 
toe," and "his eyes ... had so much blood in them" that she "thought [the men] had done 
something to his eyes." R.431,439. The beating left a "scar" on Davis's forehead. R.395. 
After the men left, Kirby and Davis went to a neighbor's house to phone the 
police. R.405,432. Officers arrived about five minutes later. R.406,444. K9 officers were 
used to search the area, but they were unable to locate a track regarding any of the 
suspects. R.406,444-45. When an officer learned that some of the stolen items were 
electronic devices, he asked Davis if those devices could be tracked through a GPS 
system. R.407,433,446. The iPad was tracked to a trailer park near Harrison Avenue, 
between Main Street and West Temple. R.407-08,448,450-51. In addition, an officer 
recovered two of the stolen cell phones and Davis's wallet just three streets north of 
Davis and Kirby's residence. R.407-408,446-48,472-74. The cell phones were not tested 
for fingerprints or DNA evidence. R.476. 
Soon after arriving at the trailer park area, the officers observed two individuals 
run in the direction of the trailers. R.482-83,488. The individuals appeared to be "tiny, 
slender" and "male[]," but no other identifying features were distinguishable. R.489. The 
officers yelled out commands for the individuals to stop, but they instead ran between 
two trailers and "disappeared." R.483,485. In pursuing the individuals, the officers went 
to trailer 14, set up a "containment on all sides," and waited there until other officers 
arrived on the scene. R.486. Officers secured the door to trailer 14 and began ordering 
people out of the trailer one-by-one. R.45 l ,486,491-92,555-556. Seven individuals were 
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in the trailer, including Mr. Craft. R.529-30,555-556,608,613,621. See also State's 
Exhibits 37-41. Officers searched Mr. Craft and did not find any weapons. R.495. After 
officers spoke with the individuals who had been in trailer 14, they transported Mr. Craft, 
Jayvaughn Firethunder, and Desmond Redkettle to jail. R.532. Evidence found inside the 
trailer was excluded at trial. R.135-143, 469. 
A silver PT Cruiser belonging to Desmond Redkettle was parked next to trailer 14. 
R.453,458,547,612. After getting a search warrant, Officer Tyler Lowe (Lowe) and 
Officer Derek Coats (Coats) searched the vehicle. R.453, 458. Both officers observed a 
bag of marijuana inside the vehicle. R.453,461. Lowe testified that the amount of 
marijuana found "wasn't a small amount." R.453. A gun holster and a mask were found 
inside the driver's door. R.459. In the trunk of the vehicle, officers found a Black 
JanSport backpack and a G. Loomis bag. R.461-62. The JanSport backpack contained an 
iPad, a flashlight, and a set of keys. R.461-62. 1 The G. Loomis bag contained "[s]everal 
bags of marijuana," video games, and a jacket. R.462. Officers also found 9mm bullets in 
the trunk of the car. R.462. The officers did not do a fingerprint or DNA testing of the 
items found in the vehicle. R.465, 551. (But see R.547, where Torres testified that 
fingerprints were taken, but that none of them came back as matching Mr. Craft. See also 
R.548, where Torres stated that the guns inside the vehicle were tested for DNA, but the 
1 The record does not indicate that the iPad found in the PT Cruiser is the one taken from 
Davis and Kirby. See R.461. When testifying about the iPad found in the PT Cruiser, 
Detective Coats stated that the iPad depicted in the photo marked as Exhibit 24 was the 
"same I-pad" as the one depicted in the photo marked as State's Exhibit 25. R.461-62. 
However, Detective Coats did not indicate that this was the same iPad that was taken 
from Davis and Kirby. See R.461-62. 
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results did not come back as matching Mr. Craft.). The keys found in the vehicle were 
returned to "the owner." 462,464. 2 
II. Facts Relevant to the Witness Identifications of the Defendant. 
Within a few hours after the incident, around 5 :00am or 6:00am, Davis went to the 
hospital for treatment of his wound, which included getting ten stitches. R.410,418-
420,434-35. Davis was at the hospital for a little over an hour. R.410,421,435. Davis 
testified at trial that while he was at the hospital, he saw police reports and photos of the 
suspects on the news. R.410,418. Detective Reuben Torres (Torres) interviewed Davis 
after he was released from the hospital. R.210,421,434-35, 531-32. At trial, there was a 
discrepancy as to when this interview took place. Davis testified that his interview with 
Davis took place "the next day or the day after" he went to the hospital. R.421. Kirby and 
Torres testified the interview with Davis occurred at 9:00 a.m. on the day of the incident. 
R.434-35,531. Torres testified that Mr. Craft was not formally arrested until 4:00 p.m. 
that afternoon, after the interview and photo line-up with Davis had been completed. 
R.533. Torres also testified that the police department does not release suspect photos to 
the media until a formal arrest is completed. R.532-33. Torres did not know "how the 
media got the pictures of the suspects," and that it "had to have been later on that day" 
2 The "owner" of the keys was not identified by Detective Coats at trial. See R.462,464. 
When testifying about the owner and the keys, Detective Coats stated that, "it's my 
recollection ... I got [the keys] back to her." R.464. See also R.462 where Detective Coats 
states, "A set of keys that I recovered out of that black-it was like a Jansport bag. And 
then Detective Torres advised me who the owner was and how to get them back to that 
person." R.462. 
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because he "wouldn't have released any information [to the press] as far as who [he] had 
in custody." R.533. 
At the interview, Torres presented Davis with a sequential photo lineup of six 
photos. R.540. Torres showed the photos to Davis one at a time. R.418, 545-56. Mr. 
Craft's photo was number five. R.545-46. Davis went through the photos "one or two 
times," but was unable to identify the "darker skinned" individual that was in his room. 
R.419. When Davis saw Mr. Craft's photo, he indicated that Mr. Craft "looked familiar." 
R.546. Torres then asked Davis if the photo of Mr. Craft was the same man that stood 
next to Davis' bed. R.546. Davis responded "yes." R.546. Davis did not provide a written 
statement to police about the incident prior to the photo line-up. R.543. In the interview, 
Davis told Torres that the man was white and that he had a goatee. R.544. 
A trial was held on June 16, 2015. Davis testified that he had an immunity grant 
with respect to the marijuana found in his garage. R.393,409. When asked about the 
marijuana on direct examination, Davis testified that he only had "an eighth of 
marijuana" for personal use. R.393 409,418. Davis denied being involved in the sale or 
distribution of marijuana. R.394, 417,419. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked 
Davis ifhe was "still sticking to [his] guns" that he had possessed only an eighth of an 
ounce. R.409,417. Davis responded "yes." R. 409 However, a search of Davis' house 
uncovered more than an eighth of an ounce of marijuana, as well as scales, pipes and 
bongs-- all items "consistent with drug distribution." R.550, 549-550. 
During the direct examination of Davis, the prosecutor asked him whether the 
"white" man who took off his mask in the March 2013 incident was sitting in the 
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courtroom. R.401-402. Davis then identified Mr. Craft. R.402. Defense counsel did not 
object to the in court identification of Mr. Craft. R.402. In addition, defense counsel did 
not file a pre-trial motion to suppress the photo line-up identification of Craft that was 
made by Davis in his pretrial interview with Torres. 
At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel made a directed verdict 
motion. R.558. The trial judge denied defense counsel's motion. R.558. In doing so, the 
following exchange between defense counsel and the trial court took place: 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I'm just going to make the motion for a 
directed verdict at this point, just on the basis that they haven't shown the 
standard required of directed verdict that my client is the one that 
committed these crimes. And I'll submit it on that. 
Trial Judge: All right. I'm going to deny it. I understand what you are 
saying. There's -- the issue is whether or not the identification is proper, but 
the --Mr. Davis testified and identified your client as the person being there. 
That is enough to take it to the jury, to allow reasonable minds to consider 
whether or not to find him guilty. So I'll deny the motion. 
R.558. ( emphasis added). 
Defense counsel called only one witness, Dr. David Dodd ("Dodd"), a Doctor of 
Psychology at the University of Utah, who was qualified at trial as an expert witness on 
issues relating to eyewitness identification. R.183, 562. Dodd testified that research 
studies show that for any person to "remember a face, we need to process it for a 
significant amount of time." R.565,566. "[S]ometimes we can make an identification 
within less than a minute, but as a rule it takes several minutes to get enough information 
to later remember a face." R.566. Furthermore, "when people are highly stressed ... 
mental processes don't work very well." R.566. In those situations where "people are 
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confronted with a weapon, they are likely to spend a good part of their time looking at the 
weapon and less of their time looking at the person ... [or] at the face." R.567. And, when 
"there's more than one perpetrator[,] the division of attention to two people or more 
diminishes the amount of time someone spends looking at one particular person." R.568. 
Dodd testified that accurate memories about faces are better if one "writes things down ... 
preferably [ with]in minutes or, if necessary, half an hour or so" of seeing a face. R.568. If 
this is not done, the mind "lose[s] [its] ability to remember details." R.568. Dodd 
cautioned that "very subtle sorts of suggestion [that are made by others] can influence the 
finite recall of memory." R.569. 
Dodd testified that he had reviewed the photos that were in the photo spread given 
to Davis, as well as the interview that took place between Torres and Davis. R.563. Dodd 
noted that Davis was put in a stressful situation, with "a weapon pointed at his face for 
the duration of the stressful event." R.567. Further, Davis did not provide any details 
about "the age of the perpetrator" and that "[t]here was also a discussion of reddish-
brown hair, which did not appear in[] any of the people in the photo spread." R.569. In 
fact, the only suspect identification that was given by Davis that "was written down by an 
officer ... [was] male, white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R. 572. Dodd 
emphasized that Torres failed to follow some of the recommendations for how proper 
eyewitness identification procedures should be carried out as described in the document, 
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"[T]he National Institute of Justice, the US Department of Justice, the Eyewitness 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. "3 R.570-71. 
Torres failed to tell Davis "that the perpetrator may or may not be in the line-up." 
R.571. Torres failed to tell Davis that "regardless of whether you pick anyone[,] we'll 
continue to make an investigation of this case." R.571-72. Torres also failed to conduct 
any "detailed interviews and detailed reports right after the crime took place." R.572. 
R.572. Torres did not mention to Davis the importance of "clearing the innocent person 
from suspicion." R.572. Torres also did not ask Davis about his "degree of certainty'' (i.e. 
whether Davis was "90 percent certain or 30 percent certain") in picking out Mr. Craft's 
photo. R.573. Knowing about certainty "right after the [photo] selection is made" is 
important because, in general, "as soon as the witness is informed that they've picked the 
right person, then their certainty goes up, and the closer they come to trial, the higher 
their certainty gets." R.573. And while the police report indicated that Davis was 
"confiden[t] ... about his ability to identify the white guy[,] .. .it was hard to say whether 
that [type of confidence] makes a difference or not." R.577. 
Although Torres used a sequential lineup, Dodd noted that "it would have been 
preferable to do a double-blind procedure ... to avoid any appearance of bias." R.574. 
576. In a double-blind procedure "the officer who's presenting the photos ... does not 
know which person is the suspect." R.574. This double-blind procedure ensures that any 
3 According to Dodd, this document, "published in 1999," was written by a committee 
made up of "people in the legal system, judges and so on, ... police officers ... [ and] a 
few defense attorneys." R.570. This committee "made a number of recommendations 
about how to conduct identification procedures that are strongly supported by the 
research." R.570. 
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identification that is made is not unfairly impacted by "subtle hints, unintended by the 
police officer.' R.575. Lastly, Dodd emphasized that there were "hundreds of cases that 
[have been] overturned" because of bad eyewitness identifications, where "the main 
factor or the only factor in acquiring the conviction" was the eyewitness testimony. 
R.575-79. 
The trial judge gave the jury a "Long instruction," which listed "factors affect[ ing] 
the accuracy of [eyewitness] identification." See Jury Instruction 20, attached as 
Addendum C. See also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-95 (Utah 1986). R. 245,591, 
581-82,584,590-592. 
III. Facts Relevant to the Improper Introduction of Co-Defendant's 
Hearsay Statements at Trial. 
In a pre-trial motion, defense counsel filed a motion to sever trial of co-defendants 
pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). R.46. The motion pointed out 
that severance was necessary "because the self-incriminating admissions of the co-
defendants [ would] be used against each of them at trial, but said admissions cannot be 
admitted as evidence in the trial of Mr. Craft." R.46. The trial court granted Mr. Craft's 
motion and ordered that Mr. Craft's case be tried separately from the co-defendants. 
R.70-71.4 At trial, during a redirect examination of Detective Torres, the State asked 
Torres to explain how he went about choosing which pictures to put in the photo line-up. 
R.551-52. The following exchange took place between the State and Torres: 
4 The co-defendants in the matter were listed as Jayvaughn Tyler Firethunder and 
Desmond Lamar Redkettle. R. 70. 
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Counsel for State: And the defense counsel mentioned hair, goatee and 
white skin as the characteristics discussed with Alex during his description 
before the lineup, correct? 
Torres: Yes. 
Counsel for State: Aside from those, are there any other factors other than 
just the similarity to the defendant that guided you in selecting the lineup 
photographs? 
Torres: As far as the other two defendants saying he was there. 
Counsel for State: No. Let me --- the --- when you were picking the 
photographs out ---
Torres: Oh. 
Counsel for State: --- was there any other information --- you said that Alex 
mentioned his hair, the goatee and the fact that he was white-
Torres: Light skinned. 
R.551-52 ( emphasis added). 
Defense counsel failed to object to the admission of the co-defendant statement 
and failed to move for a mistrial when the statement was uttered. R. 551-52. 
IV. Facts Relevant to the Phone Call from Jail. 
At trial, Torres testified about a phone call that was made from the jail. R.533-58. 
Torres noted that the phone call was made on March 17, 2013, and that it was between a 
man whom Torres identified as Mr. Craft, and an unknown woman. R.536-537. Torres 
testified that during the phone call, the female gave the male "a hard time" and said "you 
messed up, what were you thinking?" R.537. Torres testified that the male responded by 
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saying "I'm probably going to do a nickel."5 R.538. A portion of this call was admitted 
into evidence as States' Ex. 23 and played for the jury. R.538. The forty second excerpt 
of the phone call that was played for the jury contained the following exchange between a 
man and a woman: 6 
Male voice: [inaudible] 
Female voice: "What up nigger? What are you doing, stupid 
motherfucker?" 
Male voice: [inaudible] 
Female voice: "You're so fucking stupid! I'm gonna fuck you up man. I'm 
[inaudible] fucking mad at you." 
Male voice: "I wish I had called them too. And I was just. .. [ voices talking 
over each other]." 
Female voice: "What the fuck were you thinking, man?!" 
Male voice: "[inaudible] It. .. it wasn't supposed to [inaudible] like that, 
man." 
Female voice: "Stupid. Really, man." 
Male voice: "Oh you don't even know how fucking mad I am. He got-" 
Female voice: "[interrupting] I bet." 
Male voice: "He got away." 
s This portion of the call was not included in State's Ex. 23, thus the jury did not hear this 
part of the phone call when the phone call was played for the jury. See States' Ex. 23. See 
also R.535. 
6 A recording of the jail phone call was admitted into evidence and made part of the 
appellate record, but a transcript of the interview was not. See State's Ex. 23. For the 
convenience of the Court, appellate counsel has prepared uncertified transcriptions of the 
portions of the interview that are important to the issues Mr. Craft raises on appeal and 
has made those transcriptions part of this brief. 
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Female voice: "Oh you know I'll have your back and I'll-I'll be taking 
pictures of the baby and all that shit." 
Male voice: "[inaudible]." 
Female voice: "It's your board hearing, we'll go." 
Male voice: "We'll go." 
Female voice: "Dude, that's fucked up though man. I fucking feel for you. 
I'm so mad at you." 
Male voice: "I guess my homeboys -- my homeboys are a little crazy man. 
Fucking I told 'em to leave all the electronics, 'don't-don't touch nothing 
like that.' 'Leave it."' 
State's Ex. 23. 
Torres identified the male speaker on the call as Mr. Craft based on, among other 
things, the information that was recorded along with the phone call. R.537. When a phone 
call is made from jail, a computer stores information related to the phone call including 
the caller's "inmate number, name ... and the date and time" of the phone call. R.534. 
Additionally, in order to make an outgoing phone call, inmates "have to identify 
themselves." R.536. The phone call was listed under Mr. Craft's inmate number, the 
computer information was consistent with that list, and Mr. Craft identified himself on 
the recording. R.537. On cross-examination, Torres testified that on "one of Justin Craft's 
[phone calls], he actually called somebody, and then he allowed somebody else to speak 
to that person." R.539. Torres testified that he was aware of situations where other 
inmates use another inmate's code. R.539. Torres testified that he "reviewed an hour and 
a half of [Craft's] phone calls, and that person that was talking on this phone call was 
pretty much the same one as [heard in] the other ... phone conversations." R.539. 
18 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to the 
admission of the two unreliable and suggestive witness identifications made of Mr. Craft 
by Davis (a pretrial out of court photo identification and an in-court identification). The 
admission of the unreliable eyewitness identifications violated defendant's due process 
rights under Utah's Constitution. In addition, defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to object to the improper admission of an incriminating 
hearsay statement made by the co-defendants that placed Mr. Craft at the crime scene. 
This deficient performance resulted in depriving defendant of his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront his accuser. And, even if the two aforementioned instances of deficient 
performance are not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal on their own, when taken 
together, they are cumulatively prejudicial. Lastly, there was insufficient evidence to 
convict Mr. Craft of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary when the only evidence 
of these crimes was two unreliable eyewitness identifications of Mr. Craft, an improperly 
admitted co-defendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail phone call. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of two 
unreliable eyewitness identifications of defendant when the victim was 
pistol whipped during the incident and had only a limited view of his 
assailant. 
Two unreliable and unconstitutionally suggestive eyewitness identifications were 
improperly introduced as evidence in this matter without being objected to by defense 
counsel. This was ineffective assistance. "To establish ineffective assistance of counsel," 
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Mr. Craft "must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel's performance was prejudicial in 
that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Miller, 2012 UT App 172, 
,19, 281 P.3d 282. In addition, defendant must "rebut the strong presumption that under 
the circumstances, the challenged action [ or omission] might be considered sound 
trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,119, 12 P.3d 92 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the pre-trial, out of court, 
photo identification of Mr. Craft that was made by Davis in his interview with Torres. 
Counsel also performed deficiently in failing to object to the in court identification of Mr. 
Craft made by Davis at trial. Furthermore counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. 
Craft. 
A. Defense Counsel Performed Deficiently by Failing to Object to the Eyewitness 
Identifications. 
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court outlined a test to be applied for a 
proper admissibility of eyewitness identifications. 817 P .2d 77 4, 781 (Utah 1991 ). The 
Ramirez court held that the state due process clause of Utah's Constitution requires "an 
in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability" because only reliable identifications 
pass constitutional muster. Id. at 780. See also Utah Const. art I, § 7. Furthermore, "the 
resulting reliability determination [under Utah's Constitution] will meet or exceed in 
rigor the federal standard." Id. "The ultimate question to be determined is whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, [an] identification [is] reliable." Id. at 781. To 
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determine reliability, an eyewitness identification must be analyzed according to a list of 
"pertinent factors" as originally outlined in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,488 (Utah 1986). 
These factors are: 
(I) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it 
was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember 
and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the 
event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it 
was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the 
observer's. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (brackets omitted) (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 7 
The list is "not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered." State v. 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,127, 48 P.3d 953. These factors take into account "'the 
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory process 
of an honest eyewitness."' Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 490). 
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "pertinent factors" in analyzing 
whether the eyewitness identification in that matter was reliable, admissible, and 
consistent with state due process guarantees. 817 P .2d at 781. In that case, two armed 
7 The federal standard outlined in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), is 
similar, but also includes the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness and the 
length of time between the crime and the confrontation. The federal standard is not the 
focus of this argument because the Utah standard is both more rigorous and better suited 
to the facts in this case. However, because the criteria are similar and the due process 
analysis under the Utah Constitution is "as stringent as, if not more stringent than, the 
federal analysis," a violation under the Utah Constitution would also be a violation of 
federal due process. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
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robbers confronted three victims, stole from them, and fled. Id. at 776. Shortly afteiward, 
while it was still dark, the police conducted a show-up procedure. Id. "It was 
approximately one o'clock in the morning. Ramirez, a dark-complexioned Apache 
Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. He was the only suspect present and was 
surrounded by police officers. The police turned the headlights and spotlights from the 
police cars on Ramirez to provide enough light. The witnesses viewed Ramirez by 
looking at him from the back seat of a police car." Id. at 777. One of the witnesses 
identified Ramirez. Id. The "defense moved to suppress the out-of-court and in-court 
identifications" because "the initial identification procedure gave rise to a substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification," which tainted subsequent identifications. Id. 
The admissibility of the eyewitness identifications in Ramirez was "an extremely close 
case," but the court ultimately found the show-up procedure admissible. Id. at 784. 
This Court recently applied the Ramirez factors in State v. Lujan in determining 
that the trial court erred in admitting unreliable eyewitness identifications. 2015 UT App 
199, iJ 19, 357 P.3d 20, 25 cert. granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015). In Lujan, the witness 
"came face-to face" with a man who was trying to rob him while he sat in his car in his 
driveway. Id. at if 2. The witness became instantly afraid once he noticed that the man 
had either a gun or a knife. Id. at iJ 3. The witness identified the robber as "Spanish" and 
that he "had black and white longish hair, which was straight and poked out of the beanie 
to mid-ear length." Id. at iJ 2 (internal quotations omitted). The witness later identified the 
defendant at a show-up that occurred soon after the robbery and identified him again at 
the preliminary hearing. Id. at iJ iJ5,8. By contrast, at a post-arrest line-up, the eyewitness 
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was unable to identify anyone as being the robber, but he did note that the defendant and 
another man "looked familiar" to him. Id. at ,I 7. In applying the Ramirez factors, this 
Court held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the show-up and in-court 
identifications because the eyewitness description of the robber did not match defendant. 
Id. at ,r if 13, 14. In addition, the witness failed to identify the defendant at the line-up and 
the race of the eyewitness was different than the race of the defendant. Id. at ,r if 13, 14. 
Consideration of all the Ramirez factors and the totality of the circumstances in 
Mr. Craft's case leads to the conclusion that the two eyewitness identifications made by 
Davis were legally insufficient to "warrant a preliminary finding of reliability and, 
therefore, admissibility." See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. Furthermore, because the 
application of the Ramirez factors indicates that the two eyewitness identifications were 
so unreliable that they should have been excluded as evidence at trial, defense counsel 
committed prejudicial error in not objecting to the improper admission of both 
identifications on the ground that they violated Mr. Craft's due process rights under Utah 
Const. art I, § 7. 
1. The Opportunity of the Witness to View the Actor During the Event 
The first reliability factor analyzes the witness's opportunity to view the actor. 
"Pertinent circumstances include the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the 
distance between the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view the actor's 
face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were distracting noises or activity during the 
observation; and any other circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe 
the actor." Ramirez, at 782. In Mr. Craft's case, the eyewitness, Davis, had an extremely 
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short period of time to view the robbers, who were strangers to him. R.406. Davis 
testified that he first saw two of the robbers during the "five to ten minutes" that he was 
held at gunpoint in his bedroom. R.398. Davis's ability to see the robbers was drastically 
hindered because even though the lights were on, the men were wearing ski masks that 
obscured their faces. R.397-398, 411. Davis was initially only able to see the "part of 
[their] faces" "around [their] eyes." R.397-398. Davis could only see that one of the men 
had "white" skin. R.398, 401. 
During the "five to ten minutes" when Davis was in the living area, he saw one of 
the men remove his mask. R.401,412. However, Davis's opportunity to view this man 
was limited because Davis was face down on the carpet in a "sacrificial position[,]" so he 
was only able to view the man without the mask in his "peripheral vision." R.400-01,412-
15. This man was never directly in front of Davis, and at times was directly behind him. 
R.415. The living area was lit by the ambient light coming from a storage closet, while 
the rest of the house was "pitch black." R.411-13,437-38. During this entire time, Davis 
was held at gunpoint. R.400-01. As the robbers were leaving, they "shut off all the lights" 
and used their flashlights to "blind[] [Davis] with their lights" so that they could not be 
seen. R.405,412,417. Thus, Davis never had an opportunity to directly view the robbers 
in his house, without obstruction, for a lengthy period of time, and with good lighting. Cf. 
Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 at ,r 24 (Pearce, J. dissenting) (the witness observed the robber 
"face to face" for several seconds" when the "[d]efendant's face was uncovered."). 
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2. The Witness's Degree of Attention to the Actor at the Time of the Event 
Other circumstances affecting the witness's ability to observe and remember a 
participant in a crime includes whether the degree of attention to an actor is distracted by 
a second actor or other object (i.e. a weapon). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (stating "the 
[witness] testified at trial that he stared at the gunman, trying to get a good description, 
and that he did not see the pipe man as clearly as he saw the gunman.") See also Lujan, 
2015 UT App 199, at if 3 (where the witness became instantly afraid once he noticed that 
the man had either a gun or a knife.). 
Expert witness Dr. Dodd testified that "the more time someone spends looking at 
the weapon, the less time they spend looking at the face," which "disrupt[ s] later facial 
recognition." R.567. Here, Davis was held at gunpoint for a significant amount of time 
throughout the entire incident. R.398-99, 401, 413-14, 429. In addition, Davis was 
initially distracted by being hit and pistol whipped, leaving his "whole face [] bloody." 
R.395,398,400-01,412-14. Davis's attention was also distracted by the fact that there 
were three, not just one, uninvited men in his house. R.429. He was also distracted by his 
concern for his mother once she entered the room and he became focused on her in order 
to apologize to her. R.401,404,415-416. Thus, a number of distractions vied for Davis's 
attention while the robbers were in his house. 
3. The Witness's Capacity to Observe the Event, Including His Physical and 
Mental Acuity 
The third factor is the witness's capacity to observe the event. "Here, relevant 
circumstances include whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired by stress 
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or fright at the time of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by 
uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez. at 783. 
"Contrary to much accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of 
stress, perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly." Long, 721 P.2d at 489. 
Here, Davis was sound asleep and awoken to "two men punching [him] in the 
face" who dragged him from his bed and pistol whipped him. R. 395, 398, 409. Dodd 
testified that Davis "must have been quite frightened" and that Davis was under a level of 
stress "at a point where it disrupts [one's] mental processes." R.567. After the men left, 
Davis's mother noticed he was "bloody from head to toe" and "his eyes ... had so much 
blood in them" that she thought the men "had done something to his eyes." R.431,439. 
Thus, Davis's capacity to observe the event was limited not only by his heightened level 
of stress, but also by the extreme pain he would have experienced from the wound on his 
forehead that covered his face and eyes in blood. R.395,431,439,567. 
4. Whether the Witness's Identification Was Made Spontaneously and 
Remained Consistent Thereafter, or Whether It Was the Product of 
Suggestion 
Relevant considerations under this reliability factor include the length of time 
between the incident and the identification, "instances when the witness or other 
eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other 
eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the 
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. A show-up is most reliable when the eyewitness was already 
familiar with the suspect. E.g., State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1984). The 
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eyewitness is this case, Davis, however, had never seen the man who robbed him before 
and did not know Mr. Craft. R.406. 
In addition, the length of time between the incident and the initial identification of 
Mr. Craft underscores the unreliability of the identification. The exact time between the 
incident and the initial photo identification was disputed, as Davis testified he completed 
the initial photo identification "the next day or the day after" the incident, while Kirby 
and Torres testified the photo identification occurred at around 9:00 a.m. the day of the 
incident. R.421,434-35,531. Torres further testified that between seven and eight hours 
had passed between the incident and the initial photo identification. R.544. Under either 
Davis's or Torres's timeline, there was a significant amount of time that elapsed between 
the robbery and the photo line-up. That is, unlike in Ramirez, where the time between the 
incident and the identification was described as "minimal" - between "thirty minutes to 
an hour" - here the significant lapse of time between the incident and the initial 
identification was from as little as seven up to 48 hours. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783; 
R.421,434-35,531,544. 
Furthermore, the eyewitness's description of the observed perpetrator in this case 
was not immediately recorded, was not detailed, and it did not accurately identify Mr. 
Craft. R. 543,569. That is, Davis did not provide a written statement to police about the 
incident prior to the photo line-up. R.543. When Davis did provide police officers a 
description of the robber who took off his mask; Davis described him as being "male, 
white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R.572, 544. Dodd, however, noted that the 
reddish-brown hair "didn't appear in ... any of the people in the photo spread." R.569. 
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Thus, like in Lujan, the discrepancies between the initial description and Mr. Craft weigh 
in favor of excluding the photo identification in this matter. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 
199, ,r ,rB-14. 
In addition, Davis's identification of Mr. Craft was the product of suggestion. That 
is, Davis testified that he saw the photos of the suspects on the news prior to making any 
identifications of Mr. Craft. R.210,421,434-35,531-32. Thus, Davis's own testimony 
highlights the fact that his identifications were the product of improper suggestion by the 
news reports that he saw prior to identifying Mr. Craft. In addition, the procedures 
implemented by Torres in the photo identification reveals that Davis's identification of 
Mr. Craft was the product of suggestion. Specifically, after Davis indicated that the photo 
of Mr. Craft "looked familiar," Torres asked Davis if the man in the photo was the same 
man that stood next to Davis's bed. R.546. Davis responded "yes." R.546. Davis, 
however, testified that when the men were in his bedroom, both of them were wearing 
masks, so he would not have been able to see the facial features of the man who stood 
next to his bed. R.397-98,411. Furthermore, Torres' question to Davis is even more 
egregiously suggestive than Dr. Dodd's example of a police officer's "subtle hint" to a 
witness to "[l]ook at this [photo] carefully." R.575. Davis only said that Mr. Craft looked 
familiar, he said nothing about Mr. Craft being one of the men involved in the robbery. 
R.546. And, although Dr. Dodd described the photo identification was "so far as I 
know ... objectively done," Dodd testified that a "double-blind procedure" is preferable 
and was not done in this matter. R.576. Ultimately, the lack of a ''double-blind" photo 
identification opened up the possibility that Davis was influenced by "subtle hints, 
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unintended by the police officer." R.575. Further, Torres did not ask Davis about his 
"degree of certainty" after the identification. R.573. Torres also failed to tell Davis that 
the police would continue to investigate "regardless of whether [Davis] pick[ ed] anyone." 
R.571-72. Thus, there are a number of factors surrounding the photo identification that 
indicate the unreliability of Davis's eyewitness testimony against Mr. Craft. 
5. The Nature of the Event Being Observed and the Likelihood that the 
Witness Would Perceive, Remember and Relate It Correctly 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]his last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's." State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483,493 (Utah 1986). As explained above, the stressful nature of the 
event diminishes the likelihood that the witness was able to perceive and remember the 
robber. 
Even when the facts surrounding the identification are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, the totality of the circumstances suggests that the eyewitness 
identification from the show-up was unreliable and should not have been admitted. The 
eyewitness provided a very brief and inaccurate description of a man he saw during a 
highly stressful robbery and burglary, with multiple distractions, and for a brief period of 
time. 
An application of the five Ramirez factors shows that the out of court, pre-trial 
photo identification was improperly admitted at trial. In addition, the in-court 
identification was tainted both by the earlier photo identification and by the suggestive 
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circumstances of a courtroom identification. See State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657 
("unnecessarily suggestive" identification procedures give rise to "the possibility of 
irreparable misidentification"). Mr. Craft was the only defendant sitting at counsel table 
and the only realistic choice. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, iJ8. 
The circumstances of this case indicate that both eyewitness identifications were 
suggestive and unreliable and therefore violated Utah's due process clause. Defense 
counsel failed to object to the introduction of both of Davis's identifications of Craft and 
erred in not doing so as demonstrated by the application of the Ramirez factors in this 
matter. In addition, there was no strategic reason for defense counsel to not object to the 
admission of the eyewitness identifications. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, iJ19. 
That is, eyewitness identifications substantially impact and persuade a jury verdict so 
there would be no strategic reason to allow the jury to hear evidence of unreliable 
identifications that implicated Mr. Craft in the crime. See Lujan, at ,Il 9. 
B. Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Prejudicial. 
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Craft. The harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard applies to an eyewitness identification that is admitted in 
violation of Utah's due process clause. See State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, iJ16, 357 
P.3d 20, cert granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015). ("[T]he State bears the burden of 
convincing us that the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt."). Additionally, even under the test used for non-
constitutional errors for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the introduction of the 
unreliable witness identifications prejudiced Mr. Craft in this case. In order to establish 
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prejudice for a non-constitutional error regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. 
Craft must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [ deficient 
performance], the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Eyre, 
2008 UT 16, if 17, 179 P.3d 792 (internal quotation marks omitted). "This 'reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' Id. 
Here, the State's case relied heavily on the problematic eyewitness identifications. 
That is, apart from the two eyewitness identifications, there was a dearth of evidence to 
support that Mr. Craft was one of the three men involved in the robbery and burglary at 
Davis and Kirby's residence on March 12, 2013. R.394. Neither Mr. Craft's fingerprints 
nor DNA were found on any of the recovered stolen items. R.547-548. The vehicle that 
was searched next to trailer 14 did not belong to Craft. R.453,458,547,612. In addition, 
the ambiguous phone call made from the jail did not contain any incriminating statements 
and did not place Mr. Craft at Davis and Kirby's residence at the March 2013 incident. 
The eyewitness identification was therefore the State's strongest evidence in this case. 
See Lujan, 2015 UT App, ,I19 ("When the eyewitness testimony is taken away, the State 
loses its strongest evidence against Defendant, and we cannot say that the ... error in 
admitting the unreliable eyewitness identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."). Thus, had the problematic identifications been objected to and excluded from 
trial, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Mr. Craft. 
For the foregoing reasons, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
introduction of the two unreliable eyewitness identifications in this matter. Furthermore, 
there is no strategic reason that can be inferred from trial counsel's failure to object to the 
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two eyewitness identifications. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if 19. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse Mr. Craft's convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary 
and remand for a new trial. 
II. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of a 
hearsay statement by the co-defendants that implicated defendant in the 
crime, in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and 
cross examine his accusers. 
Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to sever trial of co-defendants pursuant 
to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). R.46. The motion said that severance 
was required "because the self-incriminating admissions of the co-defendants [ would] be 
used against each of them at trial, but said admissions [ could not] be admitted as evidence 
in the trial of Mr. Craft." R.46. The trial court granted Mr. Craft's motion and ordered 
that Mr. Craft's case be tried separately from the co-defendants. R.70-71. 
At trial, the State did not call either of the co-defendants, Jayvaughn Tyler 
Firethunder and Desmond Lamar Redkettle, as witnesses in its case. R.70. Nevertheless, 
an incriminating hearsay statement made against Mr. Craft by the co-defendants was 
improperly introduced at trial by a State's witness, Detective Torres. During a redirect 
examination of Torres, the State asked him to explain how he went about choosing which 
pictures to put in the photo line-up. R.551-52. The following exchange took place 
between the State and Torres: 
Counsel for State: And the defense counsel mentioned hair, goatee and white 
skin as the characteristics discussed with Alex during his description before the 
lineup, correct? 
Torres: Yes. 
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Counsel for State: Aside from those, are there any other factors other than just 
the similarity to the defendant that guided you in selecting the lineup 
photographs? 
Torres: As far as the other two defendants saying he was there. 
Counsel for State: No. Let me --- the --- when you were picking the 
photographs out ---
Torres: Oh. 
Counsel for State: --- was there any other information --- you said that Alex 
mentioned his hair, the goatee and the fact that he was white -
Torres: Light skinned. 
R.551-52 (emphasis added). 
Defense Counsel failed to object to the introduction of the improper hearsay 
evidence in this case and failed to move for a mistrial. R.551-52. Defense Counsel's 
failure to adequately respond to the improper hearsay testimony constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel because of the prejudicial impact of the hearsay statement. To 
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for this issue, Mr. Craft "must show 
that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) counsel's performance was prejudicial in that there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." State v. Miller, 2012 UT App 172, ,I9, 281 P.3d 282. 
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A. Defense Counsel Performed Deficiently by Failing to Object to the 
Introduction of the Incriminating Co-defendant Hearsay Statement. 
The Confrontation Clause provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right. .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. 
Constitution, Amend. VI. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). A 
defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers when a 
nontestifying co-defendant hearsay statement is introduced at trial that implicates 
defendant in the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132. The incriminating statements of a co-
defendant are not only "devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably 
suspect." Id. at 136. Furthermore, "the unreliability of such evidence is intolerably 
compounded when the alleged accomplice ... does not testify and cannot be tested by 
cross-examination" Id. 
Here, Torres improperly informed the jury that the co-defendants placed Mr. Craft 
at the crime scene. The co-defendants' statement constituted testimonial hearsay because 
it was an out-of-court statement that was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Utah 
R. Evid. 801(c)(2); see also State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993). In addition, it 
was testimonial hearsay because the statement had a "primary purpose of establishing or 
proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." See State v. 
McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,r 34, 302 P.3d 844. Testimonial hearsay is only admissible in 
a criminal case when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant previously had an 
opportunity for cross examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Here, because defendant 
never had an opportunity to cross examine the incriminating statement, it should not have 
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been introduced at trial. Its admission, therefore, violated both the Confrontation Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution and the hearsay rules. Id. See also Utah R. Evid. 802. 
Furthermore, trial counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to the hearsay 
statement that implicated defendant in the crime and by not moving for a mistrial once 
the statement was uttered. In determining whether trial counsel's failure falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, it is appropriate for this Court to determine whether 
a legitimate trial strategy existed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 
(1984). The presumption that counsel's performance was part of a sound trial strategy 
may be overcome when "there is a lack of conceivable tactical basis for counsel's 
actions." State v. King, 2012 UT App 203, ,r14, 283 P.3d 980 (internal quotes omitted). 
Here, there was no strategic trial reason to not object to the hearsay statement and to not 
ask for a mistrial as it was inherently unreliable and implicated Mr. Craft in the crime. 
This statement was "improper and inflammatory" in nature and had no conceivable 
beneficial value to the defendant. State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 26, 321 P.3d 1136. 
Thus, because the co-defendant hearsay statement was both improper and inflammatory, 
defense counsel's failures to object to the statement and move for a mistrial were 
objectively deficient. 
B. Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Prejudicial 
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Craft. A defendant "is prejudiced 
by counsel's actions only if the result of the proceedings would have been different 
absent the claimed deficiency." State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, ,r 9, 165 P.3d 1185. "To 
show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the defendant bears the 
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burden of proving that counsel's errors 'actually had an adverse effect on the defense' and 
that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's ... errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."' State v. Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, iJ 20, 167 
P.3d 1038 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). "'A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' Taylor v. State, 2007 
UT 12, iJ 56, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Strickland, at 694). 
However, here the deficient performance deprived Mr. Craft of his constitutional 
right to confront his accusers. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Because the deficient 
performance '"result[ed] in the deprivation of a constitutional right, [this Court] [should] 
apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless [it] find[s] the error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Crowley, 2014 UT App 33, iJl 7, 320 P.3d 
677. Regardless, the error prejudiced Mr. Craft under either standard. 
Here, there is a reasonable probability that but for the admission of the co-
defendant's inadmissible hearsay statement Mr. Craft would have not been convicted. 
Other than the improper, inflammatory, and unreliable hearsay statement, there was no 
reliable evidence that placed Mr. Craft at the crime scene. See infra, Part N. The only 
other evidence in this case against Mr. Craft was unreliable eyewitness testimony and an 
ambiguous phone call, neither of which placed Mr. Craft at the crime scene beyond all 
reasonable doubt. See supra, Part IA; see also infra, Part IV. It is therefore likely that the 
jury improperly relied on the improper co-defendant hearsay statement to find that Mr. 
Craft was present at the crime scene. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the jury 
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would have acquitted Mr. Craft if the improper co-defendant statement had not been 
introduced at trial. 
III. Even if the Instances of Deficient Performance Identified in Points I and II 
Are Not Sufficiently Prejudicial, Taken Together They Are Cumulatively 
Prejudicial. 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, this Court will reverse if the cumulative 
effect of the several instances of deficient performance undermines the Court's 
confidence that a fair trial was had. State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ,I61, 309 P.3d 
1160. In other words, the Court will reverse if there is a '"reasonable probability"' of a 
different outcome had none of the instances of deficient performance occurred. Id. at ,I24. 
Even if the two instances of deficient performance identified in Points I and II are 
not individually prejudicial, they are cumulatively prejudicial. Point I showed that 
counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the introduction of two unreliable 
witness identifications of Mr. Craft. See supra Point I. The absence of this deficient 
performance increases the probability that the jury would have acquitted Mr. Craft of 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. See supra Point I. 
Point II showed that counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the 
introduction of improper co-defendant hearsay statements that incriminated Mr. Craft. 
See supra Point II. The absence of this deficient performance increases the probability 
that the jury would have acquitted Mr. Craft of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
burglary. See supra Point II. 
And without either of the instances of deficient performance shown in Points I and 
II, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Therefore, under the 
37 
cumulative prejudice doctrine, this Court should reverse Mr. Craft's convictions for 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and remand for a new trial. 
IV. The evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Craft's convictions for 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary when the only evidence of 
these crimes were two unreliable eyewitness identifications of defendant, 
an improperly admitted co-defendant hearsay statement, and an 
ambiguous jail phone call. 
This Court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence when, viewing 
"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict ... the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il5, 63 P.3d 94. "A 
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only 
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. at ,r18 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). The Court "cannot take a speculative leap across a remaining 
[evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict." Id.; see also State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT 
App 228, ,r7, 238 P.3d 1096 (stating that a jury verdict must be based on reasonable 
inferences and not just "speculation and conjecture."). "Every element of the crime 
charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). "If the evidence does not support those elements, the verdict must 
fail." Id. 
A person commits first degree aggravated robbery "if in the course of committing 
robbery, he (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
38 
601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or ( c) takes or attempts to take an 
operable motor vehicle." Utah Code §76-6-302, R.252. 
In State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
there was sufficient evident to convict the defendant of aggravated robbery. There, two 
eyewitnesses identified the defendant as being the man who entered a 7-Eleven 
convenience store to rob a store clerk at gun point. Id. at 40. Both eyewitnesses described 
the man has "wearing a dark cowboy hat and a leather jacket." Id. at 40. Defendant's 
brother eventually confirmed that the unique articles identified by the eyewitnesses 
belonged to the defendant. Id. at 40. The defendant argued that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt for aggravated robbery because of the 
discrepancies that existed between defendant's characteristics and the descriptions given 
by the eyewitnesses, and that one of the eyewitnesses could not identify him at the 
preliminary hearing as being the robber. Nevertheless, the Watson court held that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict because the eyewitness identified the 
defendant at "a photo array shortly after the incident. .. [ and] identified the defendant at 
trial. When this evidence is combined with the evidence previously outlined which favors 
the jury's verdict, it is clear ... [that] the jury verdict is amply supported." Id. at 41 
( emphasis added). Thus, the Watson court pointed to additional evidence other than the 
photo array and in court identification (i.e. the unique clothing articles that tied the 
defendant to the crime) in denying the defendant's insufficiency claim. See also State v. 
DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246,247 (Utah 1985) (the Utah Supreme Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery where in 
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addition to the eyewitness testimony, defendant's palm print and thumb print were found 
at the scene of the robbery.). 
By contrast, in United States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2011), the court 
held that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for 
interference with commerce through robbery. In Bonner, two men robbed a North 
Carolina fast food restaurant. Id. at 211. During the incident, the two men were armed 
and were wearing baseball hats, hoodies, and pantyhose over their faces. Id. A victim 
inside the store could only identify the men as being "African-American male" Id. After 
the robbers left, police stopped an SUV that matched the description of a vehicle that had 
been seen at the restaurant. Id. at 212. Inside the vehicle were the defendant's wallet, 
three cellphones, marijuana, and ammunition. Id. at 212. The cell phone records showed 
that five calls were made in fast succession around the same time that the robbers left the 
restaurant. Id. at 212. After reviewing video footage of the crime, police officers found a 
baseball hat near the restaurant that matched a hat worn by one of the robbers. Id. At trial, 
a DNA analysis pointed out that DNA found in the hat was consistent with the 
defendant's DNA. Id. 
In U.S. v. Bonner, the defendant argued that all of the prosecution's evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction of the robbery charge because "neither the presence 
of his wallet (which contained his driver's license) in the SUV nor the New York 
Yankees baseball hat with his DNA [were] sufficient to identify him as having been 
present at the scene of the robbery." 735 F.Supp.2d 405, 410 (M.D.N.C 2010) aff'd .648 
F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2011). In addition, the defendant pointed out that the phone calls made 
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from the cell phones found in the vehicle had "innocent and useful purposes" and had 
nothing to do with criminal activity. Id. at 410. The defendant pointed out that the 
prosecution impermissibly "stack[ed] inference upon inference in its effort to identify 
him as one of the robbers." Id. at 410. 
The Bonner court agreed with the defendant that the prosecution's evidence was 
insufficient to support his convictions. In doing so, the court held that "the DNA 
demonstrates that a hat previously worn- perhaps predominately- by [the defendant] was 
present, not that [defendant] was the person wearing it during the robbery." Id. at 411. In 
addition, "no eyewitness identified the robber the [prosecution] claims was [defendant] in 
any respect, by facial feature, height, or any other feature, other than that he was African-
American male." Id. at 411. The court also noted that the phone call evidence did not 
"demonstrate that [defendant] was present at the time of the robbery." Id. at 412. The 
court held that while circumstantial evidence can often provide sufficient evidence to 
convict a defendant, the "evidence supporting identity" in this matter failed to "rise to the 
level that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 
conclusion of [the defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 413. 
A person commits first degree aggravated burglary "if in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: (a) causes bodily 
injury to any other person who is not a participant in the crime; or (b) uses or threatens 
the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is not a participant in 
the crime; or ( c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon." Utah 
Code §76-6-203, R.253. 
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In State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, ifiJ44-47, 47 P.3d 115, this Court held that 
there was sufficient evident to convict the defendant of aggravated burglary. In Martinez, 
two men entered a residence without permission and shot one of the inhabitants. Id. at ,r2. 
An eyewitness identified the defendant as the driver of the getaway car. Id. at ,rs. And, 
while the defendant was held in jail during the pendency of the case, he confessed to 
another inmate that he had participated in the crime. Id. at if9. Defendant argued against 
the reliability of the eyewitness identification because the witness "was focused on her 
children's safety, her observation lasted only a few seconds, and the presentation of the 
photo spread [by the officer] was suggestive." Id. at ,r20. In addition, the defendant 
argued that the problems related to the eyewitness identification highlighted the 
insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for murder and aggravated robbery 
as "there was no reliable or conclusive evidence to support a finding that he acted as a 
party to the offense." Id. at iJ42. This Court, however, held that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions because the defendant confessed to the 
crime to a fellow jail inmate, defendant's car clearly matched the car seen at the crime 
scene, and the eyewitness commented on the "unique eyes" of the perpetrator which 
matched defendant's eyes. Id. at iJ43. Thus, in Martinez, this Court pointed to additional 
reliable evidence other than only the eyewitness identification evidence to deny the 
defendant's insufficiency claim. 
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The marshaled evidence supporting Mr. Craft's aggravated robbery and aggravated 
burglary convictions, in the light most favorable to the verdict, is the following. 8 
1. Davis testified that while the three uninvited men were in his house on March 12, 
2013, he was able to see that one of the men had "darker skin and [the other] 
one ... white." R.397-398,401,416,424. In addition, at one point, the "white one" 
removed his mask. R.401,412. Davis was able to see the man without his mask in 
his ''peripheral vision" while he was face down on the carpet in a "sacrificial 
position." R.412-413, 400-01. 
2. Torres testified that approximately seven to eight hours after the incident, Davis 
met with Torres and was presented with a sequential photo line-up of six photos. 
R.434-35,531,544,572. Davis pointed to a photo of Mr. Craft and stated that he 
"looked familiar." R.418,545-56. In response, Torres asked Davis if the man in the 
photo was the same man that stood next to Davis's bed during the robbery 
incident. R.546. Davis responded "yes." R.546. 
3. At the pre-trial interview between Davis and Torres, Davis said that the man who 
removed his mask at his house was "male, white with reddish-brown hair and 
[had] a goatee." R.544,572. 
4. Using a GPS system, police officers were able to track the iPhone taken from 
Davis to a trailer park near Harrison Avenue, between Main Street and West 
Temple. R.407-08,488,450-51. When police officers arrived at the trailer park, two 
men ran in the direction of trailer 14 after seeing the police officers. R.482-83, 
488. Mr. Craft was among the seven individuals who were located inside trailer 
number 14. R.529-30,555-556,608,613,621. See also State's Exhibits 37-42, 
photos depicting the seven individuals found in the trailer. A photo of Mr. Craft is 
State's Ex. 41. R. 556. 
5. Officers obtained a search warrant to search a silver PT Cruiser that was located 
next to trailer 14. R.453,458. In the PT Cruiser, officers found marijuana, a gun 
holster, a mask, an I-pad, a flashlight, a set of keys, video games, and a jacket 
inside the vehicle. R.453,458-59,461-62,547,612. 
6. During the pendency of the case, a phone call was made from the jail and 
computer information showed that the phone call came from Mr. Craft. R.534-39. 
This phone call was recorded by the jail, and in this phone call a male voice told a 
female "I guess my homeboys-my homeboys are a little crazy man. Fucking I 
8 See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9); State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, mf40-44, 326 P.3d 645. 
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told 'em to leave all the electronics, 'don't-don't touch nothing like that.' 'Leave 
it.' R.534-39. See also State's Ex. 23. Torres also testified at trial that during this 
same phone call, the female stated, "you messed up, what were you thinking?" to 
which the male responded, "I'm probably going to do a nickle." R.538. 
7. At trial, Davis pointed to and identified Mr. Craft after the prosecutor asked him if 
the white man who took off his mask during the March 2013 incident was in the 
courtroom. R.401-02. 
Even when looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
prosecution presented insufficient evidence that Mr. Craft was one of the three men in 
Davis and Kirby's house on March 12, 2013. In this matter, the prosecution 
impermissibly "stack[ ed] inference upon inference in its effort to identify [Mr. Craft] as 
one of the robbers." Bonner, 735 F.Supp.2d at 410; see also State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT 
App 228, iJ7, 238 P.3d 1096. Because the convictions were based only on speculation and 
remote possibilities of guilt, the convictions should be overturned. See State v. Shumway, 
2002 UT 124, iJ18, 63 P.3d 94. 
Like in Bonner, the evidence in this matter failed to show that Mr. Craft was 
present at the scene of the robbery. Bonner, 648 F.3d at 210. Mr. Craft was not in 
possession of the stolen items and none of Mr. Craft's fingerprints nor DNA evidence 
was found on any of the items that were taken from Davis's residence or on any of the 
items that were found in the PT Cruiser. R.476,465,548, 551. Cf DeJesus, 712 P.2d at 
246 (defendant's palm print and thumb print were found at the scene of the robbery.). In 
addition, none of Mr. Craft's personal items were found in the PT Cruiser. R.453-62. 
There was simply no evidence to connect Mr. Craft to the PT Cruiser as the vehicle 
didn't belong to him but belonged to Desmond Redkettle. R.547. At best, the evidence 
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only showed that Mr. Craft was one of seven individuals found in trailer 14 and this 
evidence falls extremely short of proving that Mr. Craft was present at the crime scene. 
R.529-531; see also Bonner, 648 F.3d at 210. 
In closing arguments, the State emphasized that Mr. Craft was the only individual 
in trailer 14 who matched the description given by Davis. R.609-10,621-622. This 
statement, however, was incorrect. First, Davis identified the intruder who took of his 
face as "male, white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R. 572. While Mr. Craft had 
a goatee, he did not have reddish-brown hair, but had a mostly shaved head with very 
little dark hair. See State's Ex. 41. Second, there was another white male found in the 
trailer who did have reddish-brown hair. See State's Ex. 42. This person was Dustin 
Kil pack. R. 529. 
The eyewitness testimony was also not sufficient to place Mr. Craft at the crime 
scene. For reasons discussed supra, the eyewitness testimony was unreliable because it 
clearly failed to meet the factors outlined in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 780. See also supra, 
Part IA. Davis's ability to view the robbers was significantly hindered and the 
identifications he made of Mr. Craft were the product of suggestion. See supra, Part IA. 
In addition, the credibility of the eyewitness was suspect because Davis not only received 
immunity for his testimony which prevented him from facing drug charges, but he also 
lied about the marijuana that he had in his house. R.393,409,418. Davis testified that he 
had only "an eighth of marijuana" for personal use and denied being involved in drug 
distribution, yet a police search of his house uncovered much more than an eighth of an 
ounce of marijuana, as well as scales, pipes and bongs-all items "consistent with drug 
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distribution." R.393 409,417-418 549-550. Thus, Davis had every reason to pick out Mr. 
Craft in order to prevent himself from facing criminal charges. 
Unlike in Watson and Martinez, there was no other reliable independent evidence 
in addition to the unreliable eyewitness identifications that placed Mr. Craft at the crime 
scene. See State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 
App 126. There were no unique clothing articles that tied Mr. Craft to the robbery. See 
Watson, at 40 (the unique dark cowboy hat and leather jacket tied the defendant to the 
crime scene). Likewise, there were not any unique facial characteristics that tied Mr. 
Craft to the Crime Scene. See Martinez, at ,I4 (the eyewitness noted the "unique eyes" of 
the perpetrator which matched defendant's eyes). 
In addition, unlike the facts in Martinez, there was no independent confession 
given by Mr. Craft to the crime. Martinez, at ,I9. The evidence of the phone call made 
from the jail did not constitute a confession by Mr. Craft. R.537-39. See also State's Ex. 
23. Even in assuming that Mr. Craft was the man talking in the phone call, none of the 
ambiguous statements contained in the call support the view that Mr. Craft admitted to 
being present at the crime scene. The statement, "I'm probably going to do a nickle" 
showed at most that Mr. Craft believed he would likely be incarcerated. R.538. This, 
however, is a far cry short of confessing to a crime. That is, believing that jail or prison 
time is imminent is, at best, Mr. Craft expressing his concern and anxiety that he may not 
prevail at trial. Simply being arrested for the felony charges could lead Mr. Craft to 
express his frustration that incarceration was an inevitable outcome. A proper reading of 
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this call is that Mr. Craft was reaching out for support because he was facing felony 
charges and fearing long-term incarceration. See Bonner, 735 F.Supp.2d at 409, 411-412. 
In addition, the statement "I guess my homeboys ... I told 'em to leave all the 
electronics, 'don't -don't touch nothing like that" did not place Mr. Craft at the crime 
scene. See State's Ex. 23. That is, this ambiguous statement lacks any contextual 
information about who, what, when, or why it is being uttered. To infer that this 
statement means that Mr. Craft was admitting that on March 12, 2013 he was present at 
Davis and Kirby's residence is only based on "speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. 
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ifl8; see also State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, if7. Just 
because the topic of electronics is being discussed in the jail phone call does not mean 
that this discussion is about the electronics taken from Davis and Kirby, and to think 
otherwise is an example of extreme speculation. Shumway at ,r18. 
The admission of the improper co-defendant hearsay statement was also not 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. That is, this statement was inherently unreliable 
because of the self-serving interests of the co-defendants. See infra, Part II. 
Ultimately, because there was no reliable eyewitness identification in this matter 
and no reliable independent evidence to place Mr. Craft at the crime scene, there was 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The jury thus took an impermissible 
"speculative leap" with the evidentiary gaps to convict Mr. Craft. Shumway, at if 15. 
This issue is preserved based upon defense counsel's directed verdict motion. 
R.558. But to the extent the Court believes it is not, it should review the issue for plain 
error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, if3, 282 P.3d 1066. "When challenging 
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the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error doctrine, 'a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial 
court erred in submitted the case to the jury."' Id. ( quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
ifl7, 10P.3d346). 
For reasons mentioned supra, the evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Craft's 
convictions. The prosecution presented insufficient that Mr. Craft was one of the three 
uninvited men that entered Davis and Kirby's residence on March 12, 2013. See Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, ,rt 7. Therefore, the insufficiency of the evidence was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary charges to the jury. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Craft respectfully asks this Court to reverse and 
remand with an order of dismissal because the evidence was insufficient. Alternatively, 
Mr. Craft asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new trial because of the improperly 
admitted evidence regarding the unreliable eyewitness identifications and the improper 
co-defendant hearsay statement. 
l'I "0 SUBMITTED this ____.._,j_ _ day of March, 2016. 
TERESA L. WELCH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
JUSTIN PAUL CRAFT, 
Defendant. 
custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shantec 
Prosecutor: COOLEY, BRADFORD D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BOWN, CHRISTOPHER G 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 11, 1990 
Sheriff Officel: 311469 
Audio 
Case No: 131902555 FS 
Judge: PAUL B PARKER 
[)ate: August 24, 2015 
Tape Number: S34-10.41 Tape Count: 10.52 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 06/17/2015 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 06/17/2015 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years and which 
may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years and which 
may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
Printed: 08/24/15 10:56:00 Pagel of 2 
Case No: 131902555 Date: Aug 24, 2015 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
To run concurrent. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
JUSTIN CRAFT 
LOUIE 
Restitution 
Pay in behalf 
Restitution 
Pay in behalf 
Amount: 
of: KIRBY 
Amount: 
of: VICTIM 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
$2250.00 Plus Interest 
$2000.00 
Defendant has a right to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing. 
CUSTODY 
Printed: 08/24/15 10:56:00 Paqe 2 of 2 
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§ 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary, UT ST§ 76-6-203 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-203 
§ 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary 
(I) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a 
burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is not 
a participant in the crime; or 
( c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section 
76-1-601. 
O Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § l; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6. 
Notes of Decisions (54) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-203, UT ST§ 76-6-203 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Dorumenl C 2016 Thomson Reuters No cla1111 to origin;il US. Government Works. 
WESTLAW © 2016 Tho1rison Reu'.ers No claim to original U S Govemmer.t Works. 
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 (2012) 
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(l) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6-1-60 I; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a 
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. ~ 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c. 
271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, cff. May 5, 2003. ~ 
WESTLAV\' G 2016 Thomson Reuters rsJo claim to original U S Government Works 
U.S. Const. amend VI 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
infonned of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
